[Vol. 100:1265 expressed in their opinions, quite seriously" (p. 5) and attempts to jus tify them using social choice analysis. 2 Stearns displays a unique ability to convey extremely complex le gal, economic, and political ideas in a clear and precise manner. His work is especially valuable because it is accessible to scholars in a va riety of fields, and it will. force them to reconsider their analytical frameworks.
Perhaps the greatest strength of Stearns's book is that he presents a grand unified theory of the Court's rules of constitutional process and the resulting development of doctrine. This strength can also be a weakness, however, because he tends to read precedent and the his torical evidence to fit his thesis, even when other explanations might be more persuasive.
In this Review, we will explore two such alternatives, grounded in political science and constitutional theory. We hope to show that these disciplines are at least as effective as economics in illuminating consti tutional lawmaking.
I. POSITIVE THEORIES OF APPELLATE COURT DECISIONMAKING
Positive models of Supreme Court decisionmaking begin with the rational choice paradigm: that individuals make decisions that they believe are most likely to lead to their preferred outcomes. Political scientists who study appellate courts have debated the relevance of a court's collegial nature to its decisions. Stearns adds to this literature by focusing on a classical economic theory of collective decisionmak ing, Arrow's Theorem.3 He uses Arrow's voting paradox in both its normative sense (as Arrow originally proposed it) and its positive sense, as it has been employed by social scientists ever since.4 2. Stearns recognizes that politics and ideology influence adjudication, but contends that the justices aim to resolve the dispositive case issues in a legally consistent way: "I take doc trine seriously not because I believe that doctrine neutrally drives case results, but rather because I believe doctrine serves as one of several important constraints that influence the manner in which justices achieve desired case outcomes." P. 5.
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951).
4. Stearns attempts to distinguish between normative "legitimacy" (i.e., society's accep tance of an outcome because of the fairness of the procedures followed) and normative "jus tification" (i.e., the merits of a result as compared to foregone alternatives). Pp. 63-67. This argument fails to persuade within the social choice framework. He uses "normative" in the first instance in a different sense than it is employed in the second -process rules cannot produce normatively acceptable outco m es (under social choice theory) unless they are con sistent with the goals of decisionmaking considered by Arrow. It may be true that the public perceives outcomes as legitimate because. they were reached by following predetermined rules. This is a positive account, however, not a normative one. Whether the public should have this perception is a question that goes to the normative justification for the outcomes. Stearns's arguments about the rightness of rules that resolve the voting paradox are norma tive, of course.
Initially, we consider the central aspect of Arrow's theory of social choice upon which Stearns relies to create his process model. We then examine whether existing political science accounts of Court decisions provide a sounder, more tractable model.
A. Arrow's Insights into Group Decisionmaking

Introduction
Scholarship built upon Arrow's Theorem (or its descendants) has traveled · under various banners, including public choice or social choice theory,5 but shares a herita· ge in the work of Arrow and Duncan Black.6 Arrow proved that no collective decisionmaking process could both satisfy accepted notions of fairness and produce a consistent or "rational" outcome, that is, one that would meet the requisites for ra tionality in individual decisionmaking.7 Most notably, he demonstrated mathematically that aggregating collective preferences according to democratic methods, such as majority rule, will not always yield a sin gle, transitive collective preference.8 As a result, the decisionmaking process "cycles," moving through a series of options without ever clearly selecting one. The result is the classic "voting paradox," first 5. The economic theory of group decisionmaking has assumed many labels, including social choice, public choice, collective choice, or positive political theory. Saul Levmore, Preface, in MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY xvii, xi (1997) . For a discussion of the schizophrenic naming and defining of the school, see Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Fo reword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992) (discussing the academic debate over the precise meaning of the terms "public choice," "social choice," and "positive political theory," which clearly share "familial" connections).
6. For the classic texts by each author, see ARROW, supra note 3; and DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958) . Daniel Farber, a legal scholar who has written extensively on social choice, observed: "Kenneth Arrow is undoubtedly the pa terfamilias of social choice theory .... Arrow's Theorem is the foundation for what is now a huge body of literature on mechanisms of social choice." Daniel S. Farber, Positive Th eory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. RE V. 1565, 1573 (1995 Cycling is easy to illustrate. Imagine three individuals, A, B, and C, who must make a group decision among three options. A ranks her preferences 1, 2, 3; B ranks his preferences 2, 3, 1; and C ranks her preferences 3, 1, 2. In a pairwise vote between choices 1 and 2, choice 1 prevails. In a vote between choices 2 and 3, choice 2 prevails. If -the group's preferences were rational, it would prefer choice 1 to 3, that is, its preferences would be transitive. In a vote between 1 and 3, how ever, choice 3 prevails.10 If all three individuals vote sincerely in accor dance with their preferences, there is no rational means of choosing one option, and thus there is no "Condorcet winner." No minimum winning majority can withstand a challenge by the losing participant, who can always entice one member of the majority to support a differ ent option. For example, if choice 1 prevails, B can persuade C to form a new majority in favor of choice 3. If choice 3 prevails, A can per suade B to shift to choice 2, and so forth. The majority cycles.
Arrow's Theorem in Legal Scholarship
While many social scientists immediately began to utilize Arrow's work on collective decisionmaking,11 law professors were not as quick to appreciate its relevance to their studies. Beginning in the mid-1970s and picking up speed in the last decade,12 legal scholars have sought to evaluate law and legal structures by considering how institutional characteristics influence collective choice.13 Since 1986, more than 100 9. See ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 50 (describing his surprise at learning, after circulating his own work, that "[t]he paradox of majority voting had indeed been discovered before -in fact, by the French author the Marquis du Condorcet in 1785!"); H.P. Young, Condorcet's Th eory of Voting, 82 AM. POL. SCI. RE V. 1231 (1988) . In the original book, Arrow credits E.J. Nanson with first recognizing the paradox in 1882. ARROW, supra note 3, at 3 n.3. 11. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL v ALVES i (2d ed. 1963) (observing in the preface to the second edition that Social Choice and Individual Va lues "has to some extent acquired a life of its own" and thus choosing in the second edition to append material responding to commentary on the book, rather than rewrite the main text); ARROW, LIVES OF THE LAUREATES, supra note 7, at 51 (describing the voluminous work built on social choice theory).
12. David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Fu ture of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 659-60 (1997) (book review) ("It was not until the mid1970s that legal scholars first explored the implications of public choice, even though many of the seminal insights of both interest group theory and social choice had been in place for over a decade. Since then, public choice has taken the legal literature by storm.").
13. For example, legal scholars have invoked social choice principles to argue that the legislative process is inherently flawed, thereby justifying greater Supreme Court interven-law review articles have included "social choice" or "public choice" in their titles, and more than 400 articles have cited Arrow's classic text, Social Choice and Individual Values. 1 4 Within the past decade, law journals have devoted entire issues to articles on the application of choice theory to the study of law . 15 Frank Easterbrook was the first legal commentator to view the de cisionmaking of collegial courts from a social choice perspective. 16 Since then various legal scholars have recognized that multijudge ap pellate courts may be subject to decisionmaking flaws predicted by so cial choice theory and have considered the resulting implications for normative adjudication theories. 17 In previous articles, Stearns demonstrated that he is particularly adept at articulating and applying the precepts of social choice the ory.20 His delineation of the voting paradox in the current book is out standing and will be a great resource for anyone seeking to understand Condorcet's and Arrow's ideas (pp. 42-52, [81] [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] . Stearns creatively elucidates a number of complicated social choice concepts, making them both accessible and interesting. Perhaps his best effort is his modern revision of Shakespeare's tale of King Lear to illustrate the "empty core" problem.21
The driving force of Stearns's book is his argument that appellate courts, as collective decisionmaking bodies, are governed by Arrow's Theorem and therefore are prone to cycling. He presents a group of Supreme Court procedural doctrines that he maintains can be ex plained and justified as responses to cycling and related social choice conundrums. For example, outcome voting, rather than issue voting, ensures that the Court will reach a decision even when no stable ma jority of justices can agree both on the means (issue) and the ends (outcome) in a particular case (pp. [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107] [108] [109] [110] [111] . In instances where only outcome voting would lead to a decision, the narrowest grounds doc trine offers a fair interpretation of the Court's holding in the case be cause it limits the ruling to the position that was at least the second best choice of a majority of justices (pp. 124-29).
Stearns scrutinizes a handful of cases in order to prove that this so cial choice account of outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doc trine is an accurate positive theory. His reasoning, however, is primar ily normative, not explanatory. Most significantly, he does not prove that outcome voting developed to respond to cycling problems; in fact, he does not offer a historical account for its emergence (although it seems an obvious default rule). Rather, Stearns provides a justification for keeping the outcome voting rule. The narrowest grounds doctrine also appears to have been adopted for largely pragmatic reasons: judges do not know ex arite their relative position in future cases, and therefore they select a rule that is least likely to be completely con trary to their future decisions. Rational choice theory offers the best 20. See 21. Pp. 54-58. Cycling can be seen as one instance of the "empty core" phenomenon. A bargaining situation requiring a majority agreement contains an empty core when a partici pant may be persuaded to defect from an agreement by the offer of a bigger share and such defection changes the majority agreement. explanation for this selection.22 Again, Stearns sets forth a compelling rationalization for the narrowest grounds doctrine, but not an explana tion for it.
Stearns correctly argues that the most important rules of constitu tional decisionmaking concern "justiciability" -the fitness of a mat ter for judicial disposition (pp. 35-38, 157-211). The key doctrine i;! standing, which denies federal court access to any plaintiff who cannot show an "injury in fact" caused by the defendant that is judicially re dressable (pp. 37-38, 160-70). Stearns's most original contribution is to apply his social choice approach to standing (Chapters Five and Six). He argues that standing is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of stare decisis. He contends that the rule of stare decisis is similar to the rule of outcome voting in that both respond to the problem of cycling: outcome voting addresses cycling within cases, while stare decisis re sponds to cycling across cases (pp. 158, 170-77).
Stare decisis, however, poses its own social choice dilemma, "path dependency": parties, particularly organized interests, can manipulate the development of substantive legal doctrine by presenting cases in a predetermined order and thereby restrain the Court, which is bound by its precedent.23 One of Arrow's prerequisites for fair group deci sionmaking is that the decision should be independent of the order of presentation of alternatives. Stare decisis, coupled with sophisticated litigation strategies, violates this requirement. This conclusion under girds Stearns's central thesis: that standing doctrine allows the Court to impede parties' attempts at path manipulation by making it more difficult to present cases on their merits (p. 159). Specifically, standing helps ensure that the order in which cases are presented is primarily determined not by litigant strategy, but by chance events directly in juring plaintiff and beyond her control (pp. 23-24, 157, 159, 162, 177- 80, 198, 204, 208) .
As with outcome voting and the narrowest grounds doctrine, Stearns provides a compelling normative justification for stare decisis and standing, but his case studies do not persuasively explain the de velopment or utilization of these doctrines. A more appealing, direct account as to why courts respect precedent is the desire for fairness: similarly situated parties should be treated alike. Moreover, consistent decisionmaking is a hallmark of rationality and contributes to a court's legitimacy. Again, the simple "rational actor" model explains judicial 22. These two doctrines seem to be instances of the strategic theory of judicial behavior as developed in political science, which we wilLdiscuss in the next section. We do not, how ever, offer a detailed account of its ability to explain outcome voting or the narrowest grounds rule because that would exceed the scope of this Review. behavior. Indeed, the standing doctrine can be explained by a par ticular rational choice theory developed in political science, as de scribed below.
In our view, Stearns's approach does not function well as a positive theory because it is not a true model of Supreme Court decisionmak ing, in the sense that it is not falsifiable. His theory fails to provide ex ante for any potential conditions that, if observed, would refute the model.
Some Conclusions About the Social Choice Theory
Stearns's work on the Supreme Court has been anticipated by so cial science studies of majority rule institutions, which focus primarily on legislatures. Social scientists have demonstrated that strict majority rule in a setting where individuals hold some diversity of viewpoints generally does not produce a Condorcet winner.24 Thus, cycling is in evitable on a theoretical level when groups make even the simplest decision among multidimensional options. Nevertheless, cycling does not appear frequently in practice because most majority rule institu tions adopt anticycling procedures or include strategic members who act in such a way as to offset the cycling problem. Stearns obviously has given much thought and energy to the sub tleties of social choice theory and the possibilities that arise by apply ing this theory to Supreme Court decisionmaking. The resulting ideas are keenly original and innovative.
The social choice approach, however, does less than Stearns claims for it. He presents his account as a metatheory that both provides a model of process doctrines and outperforms other models of these doctrines. Although Stearns comprehensively analyzes all the perti nent decisions, we believe that his theory best explains a group of un usual cases rather than the standard doctrines. Political science pro vides a stronger, more tractable model of process doctrine generally. Stearns's theory may supplement that model, but fails to supplant it.
B. The Insights of Political Science About Collegial Courts
Attitudinal and Strategic Theories of Judicial Behavior
To answer the question of how judges make decisions, political sci entists have developed two competing models: attitudinal and strate gic. Both models begin with the recognition. that judges are at core human decisionmakers, and rational choice theory tells us that judges, like human beings generally, will seek to achieve their goals or prefer ences. Thus, both political science models build on the same base as the social choice one: the rational actor.
The attitudinal model posits that a judge seeks to maximize her sincere policy preferences, termed "attitudes".28 This model has been the dominant positive theory of court behavior because empirical studies demonstrate that it has substantial explanqtory power.29 Most adherents of the model will concede that it does not account for all factors in judicial decisionmaking30 and acknowledge that legal rules and doctrines have been shown to restrain, and in some instances to guide, adjudication.31 But they point out that the attitudinal model is a valuable tool for explaining and predicting judicial behavior.
Strategic theorists argue that the attitudinal model can be im proved without unnecessarily complicating it or detracting from its 28. See 30. In fact, models are inherently incomplete, a simplified and useful construct of real ity. A "model" that included every characteristic of the object of study would not be a model but would rather be the thing itself.
31. See, e.g. , George & Epstein, supra note 29.
[Vol. 100:1265 predictive ability.32 Strategic theories of judicial behavior adopt the at titudinalist position that justices seek to achieve policy goals but claim that justices, in order to accomplish this end, must and do consider the preferences and likely conduct of other relevant actors. Hence, strate gic theorists emphasize the influence of strategic f actors, such as inter actions with colleagues on the court (internal dynamics) or reactions of other institutional actors, most notably Congress and the President (exogenous constraints).33 Such strategic considerations are absent from Arrow's Theorem. Arrow assumed that preferences were not af fected by the decisionmaking process, and he therefore ignored strate gic (or game) aspects of the process that would prevent someone from voting his or her true, or sincere, preference.34 Relaxing either or both assumptions -as the strategic theory of judicial process does -: will prevent cycling.
· 2. An Attitudinal Account of Standing Doctrine A major aspect of Stearns's work is his positive explanation for the development of the standing doctrine, which assertedly harmonizes most of the relevant cases and thereby improves on existing theories (Chapter Six). In our view, however, the attitudinal model provides a simpler, more intuitive explanation for standing decisions. It can ac count for the Supreme Court justices' votes on standing by reference to their preference to favor. or disfavor sociopolitical underdogs. Lib eral justices are far more likely than their conservative counterparts to grant standing to those who are of disadvantaged social or economic status, such as the poor, ethnic minorities, employees, and criminals. Conversely, conservative justices are more likely than their liberal colleagues to confer standing on the powerful.
Consider, for example, the New Deal and Burger Court decisions that adopted very strict standing requirements. Stearns deems these cases surprising because of the two Courts' contrasting policy prefer ences.35 As we will detail in Part II, the Court created standing in the 32. See 34. ARROW, supra note 3, at 6-8.
35. Pp. 35-38. One of the problems with Stearns's explanation of the standing decisions is that the rules he vaunts are merely what the Court allows us to see of its decisionmaking processes, the great majority of which are entirely secret. It is hard to conceive of these rules, then, as meaningful constraints on judicial behavior when most of that behavior is veiled and 1930s and 1940s primarily to deny federal judicial access to businesses challenging progressive legislation.36 By contrast, the Burger Court used standing mainly to foreclose litigation by disadvantaged groups attacking conservative statutes.37 Nonetheless, the New Deal and Burger Courts did share an important feature: both wanted to protect other governmental actors. Access doctrines like standing allow the Court to deny relief to those seeking to challenge existing political power arrangements. Thus, the Court's treatment of standing is irre trievably linked to its position on those with access to power in the first instance.
Moreover, Stearns's process theory is unnecessarily complex. The attitudinal • model explains both the New Deal and the Burger/Rehnquist Courts' reliance on standing to protect liberal and conservative legislation, respectively. The attitudinal approach does so with less complexity than a social choice model. Stearns does not achieve greater overall success in predicting Court behavior. If a sim ple paradigm explains the observed events as accurately as a more complicated and less obvious approach, then the former should be preferred.38 While it is true that humari behavior is complex, it need not be made more so.
Admittedly, Stearns's process model improves upon existing mod els of judicial behavior by adding to them and creating a more com plete theory. Therefore, social choice is not "the" explanation, but rather is part of several complementary theories (including the attitu dinal one) that can account for the observed outcomes. Hence, when combined, these approaches result . in a multidimensional, fully realthe part we see is carefully choreographed to ensure the appearance of principled decision making.
36. See infra Section 11.B.l.
37. For example, the Burger Court held that plaintiffs must establish a direct relation ship between the challenged action and a personal injury and must show that the requested remedy will redress that injury. This requirement prevented blacks from challenging alleg edly discriminatory police practices, see, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) [Vol. 100:1265 ized model of judicial behavior that no model alone can capture.39 We will now explore other theories that further enrich our understanding.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND HISTORY
He finds the answer in social choice theory: through standing, the Court has consistently rejected attempts to conduct litigation on an ideological basis, whether liberal or conservative (pp. 159, 162-64, 168-70, 198, 204-11). Steams sees standing as operating on two levels.
First, as noted above, standing improves fairness by reducing the ability of interest groups to manipulate the evolution of legal doctrine by controlling the order of case decisions -a "path dependency" that results from stare decisis (pp. 157-62, 177 -80, 190-91, 198, 204, 208-11) . The accidental occurrence of an individualized injury, not lawyerly calculation, largely determines when a federal court grants access. 41 Second, standing promotes separation of powers by minimizing at tempts to force judicial creation of positive law where Congress has remained silent, thereby protecting its power to leave legal issues un decided until a legislative consensus has formed (pp. 158-59, 164-66, 198, 201, 209) . Standing thus helps to preserve the fundamental consti tutional structural distinction between legislative and judicial law making processes (pp. 159-60, 198-211). Congress has power to create (or decline to create) law as it sees fit, to aggregate preferences, and to control the timing and scope of its legislation (pp. 159, 201-02). By contrast, courts fashion law only on an ad hoc basis when necessary to decide an actual case, and they are limited to applying legal principles rather than personal preferences (pp. 201-03).
39. Social scientists have observed that some law and economics scholars mistakenly believe that they must present a theory that beats other theories and exists instead of those theories. Such an approach is both unscientific and incomplete. Stearns characterizes "injury" as a metaphor to describe when for tuitous circumstances have harmed a plaintiff seriously enough to jus tify shifting the burden of legislative inertia and allowing a court to formulate positive law (pp. 204-11, 257-59, 262-65, 268-69). Accord ingly, standing enables doctrine to evolve more fairly and consistently with the "majoritarian norm" of democratic lawmaking (p. 300).
Stearns applies this social choice theory to the three main catego ries of standing cases. First, he endorses the precedent prohibiting third party standing as promoting fairness and reducing manipulation (pp. 162-64, 249-50, 259-69). One illustration is the Court's denial to the Sierra Club of the right to claim that a construction project had violated federal environmental laws because the Club failed to allege that its members actually had used the national park that would be negatively affected by the building.42 Stearns concludes that the Court correctly held that a park patron, rather than a special interest group, would be the appropriate plaintiff (pp. 263-66, 277-78). He therefore rejects the scholarly consensus that Sierra Club invented a pleading technicality to express the majority's political antipathy towards environmentalists.43 · Second, Stearns contends that the Court's ban on "generalized grievances" ensures fairness by forcing the most majoritarian depart ment to deal with illegal government conduct that produces diffuse harms, rather than allowing ideological litigants to commandeer the least representative branch to make positive law (pp. 250, 269-71 ). He asserts, for example, that the Court properly denied standing to "tax payers" and "citizens" who claimed that (1) a statute authorizing se cret CIA spending violated the Constitution's requirement that Congress provide a public accounting;44 (2) Representatives' simulta neous membership in the military reserves ignored a constitutional prohibition on such dual service;45 and (3) the government's grant of property to a religious institution ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.46 Steams argues that the alleged constitutional violations in these three cases did not directly harm any particular citizen in a man ner substantial enough to warrant a grant of standing and thus an as sumption by courts of lawmaking power (pp. 168-69, 269-70). Again, he questions the prevailing wisdom that these cases simply reflected hostility toward antiwar activists and strict separationists (pp. 167-69, 233, 269-70).
Third, Steams characterizes standing's "causation" and "redress ability" prongs as shorthand for denying anyone the right to allege that unlawful government conduct has created a market distortion, the removal of which will benefit the plaintiff (pp. 250, 271-79). For in stance, in Allen v. Wr ight,41 the Court conceded that IRS tax exemp tions to discriminatory private schools had constitutionally injured black public school children by diminishing their ability to receive an integrated education.48 Nonetheless, the majority denied standing be cause the plaintiffs had not shown that the IRS, as distinguished from the private schools and their parental supporters, had caused their in jury. 49 The Court concluded that the plaintiffs were making a general complaint about an executive agency's internal program.50 Steams agrees that citizens should ask the political branches, not the courts, to eliminate market distortions such as the one created by the IRS ex emption (pp. 32-35, 271-77, 279).
A General Critique of the Social Choice Approach
Steams's theory has considerable explanatory power. Nonetheless, it rests upon two debatable premises.
The first is that the Court applies standing in a relatively apolitical manner to repel all ideological litigants. If this is true, however, why did the Warren Court in Flast v. Cohen51 break with ironclad prece dent and allow taxpayers to claim that congressional spending for church-run schools violated the Establishment Clause? Was it not for the transparent purpose of furthering the Court's liberal agenda of ending public support for religion? Conversely, didn't the Burger Court serve conservative political ends (and eviscerate Flast) by re jecting the standing of taxpayers to question the federal government's Although Stearns plausibly answers such questions through com plex social choice analysis, most scholars have a simpler explanation -partisan politics.57 While conceding the force of such political argu ments, Steams astutely points out thatthey cannot account for several anomalies in the standing cases or explain why this doctrine has per sisted despite the Court's shift from predominantly Democratic to Republican appointees (pp. 216, 280-81). For instance, crass politics should have led the "law and order" Burger and Rehnquist Courts to shut the federal courthouse doors to accused and convicted criminals, yet the opposite has occurred. The reason, Stearns says, is that crimi nals are not ideologues trying to manipulate the evolution of legal doc trine, but rather are alleging the most serious kind of individual injury -that they will be unlawfully imprisoned or executed.58 In any event, 95 (1983) , the Court would have allowed Lyons to sue for damages resulting from the police depart ment's application of a dangerous "choke hold" to him, but correctly denied him standing to [Vol. 100:1265 he criticizes political explanations as "nonfalsifiable": one cannot prove or disprove hidden motives that are not expressed in opinions (pp. 280-81).
But standing decisions do reflect, if not partisan politics, a broader political theory. Indeed, that theory forms Stearns's second premise: the Constitution imposes strict standing requirements because our democracy requires minimal judicial interference with the political branches. We submit, on the contrary, that standing sabotages the constitutional will of "We the People," who authorized the federal ju diciary to check Congress and the President so that they neither ex ceed their delegated powers nor violate anyone's constitutional rights.59 Before developing this thesis further, however, we will first at tempt to refute Stearns's argument that the historical evidence sup ports his social choice theory of standing.
B. Th e History of Standing
The New Deal Era
Stearns's version of events may be summarized as follows. By 1941, President Roosevelt had appointed a majority of the justices, who agreed doctrinally on two critical constitutional issues: the validity of the New Deal and the incorrectness of the substantive due process ju risprudence epitomized in Lochner v. New Yorll'° (pp. 220-22, 228-29). The emerging liberal Court developed standing to foreclose attacks on progressive legislation in the reactionary lower federal courts, which would have sustained such challenges and thereby compelled the Supreme Court to issue substantive constitutional rulings (pp. 36-37, 226-28). These holdings would have differed radically from those of the preceding era, which had sharply limited the power of Congress and the states to address social and economic ills (pp. 226-29). Such wholesale reversals would have exacted a high political cost, exposing the Court as nakedly partisan and damaging its credibility and per ceived impartiality (p. 226).
We are skeptical of Stearns's account of New Deal history for two reasons. First, from 1937 to 1942, the justices had no qualms about ex- 60. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) . Stearns acknowledges that the Court eventually became split on whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause should be interpreted as incor porating the entire Bill of Rights against the states (the Black/Douglas position) or only those rights that were fundamental (the Frankfurter view). Pp. 229-30. Nonetheless, he stresses that this division was bipolar, and that therefore the justices could predict the out come of any particular case. P. 230.
plicitly rejecting the substantive constitutional decisions of even their very recent predecessors.61 For example, the Court repudiated long established limits on Congress's power under the Commerce Clause62 and decades of substantive <;lue process cases that had thwarted state economic legislation.63 The Court paid little political price for this about-face because the vast majority of Americans (and the political officials they elected) supported this trend. Moreover, any resulting institutional costs to the Court (e.g., being perceived as applying po litical rather than legal principles) seem to have been far less than the damage to its prestige caused by the intransigence of the conservative . justices in the early 1930s.
Second, Steams argues that, without standing, the reactionary fed eral district and appellate judges would have cleverly distinguished the Supreme Court's new decisions on substantive constitutional law (pp. 226-28). In particular, they would have struck down progressive legislation that the Court had not yet specifically considered, thereby forcing its hand. But we think the justices would have been unwise to choose standing as the principal tool to discipline lower federal courts. If these sly Neanderthal judges could distinguish the Court's seemingly unequivocal substantive holdings, why could they not also manipulate the Court's new standing doctrine -which was largely discretionary and very malleable -to grant plaintiffs access and rule on the mer its?64 Steams leaves this question unanswered.65 61. Stearns recognizes this phenomenon, pp. 218, 221-26, but not its tendency to under mine his thesis.
62. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (allowing Congress to regulate a farmer's growth of wheat for personal consumption, despite previous cases holding that "commerce" did not include production and that Congress could not reach activity that oc curred entirely within a state); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (sustaining the National Labor Relations Act by overruling an unbroken line of precedent which had established that labor was not a matter of interstate commerce). 63. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state mini mum wage law even though the Court had struck down a virtually identical statute the year before as a violation of employers' substantive due process right to freedom of contract).
64. Again, Stearns acknowledges the prudential and flexible nature of standing, pp. 4, 30, 161-62, but not its negative implications for his argument.
65. A complete explanation would require an intensive study of lower federal court cases from that era. Thus, Stearns's claims are not supported by adequate empirical evi dence.
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Th e Warren Court
Almost everyone agrees that the Warren Court relaxed standing to facilitate implementation of its liberal agenda.66 First, its activist crea tion of new constitutional rights would have been hollow without plaintiffs to enforce them, especially those who had no real remedy in the political branches (such as minorities and criminal defendants). Second, the Court sought to effectuate Great Society legislation, al lowing Congress to authorize statutory enforcement by plaintiffs who had suffered generalized harms with no common law antecedent (e.g., the right to a clean environment or to live in an integrated commu nity).
Stearns accepts this account, but uses social choice theory to com plement it (pp. 231-34). He contends that, because a solid majority on the Warren Court shared a liberal ideology (with at most bipolar divi sions on a few issues), the justices could accurately predict how critical legal questions would be defined and resolved (p. 232). Again, al though social choice provides a fresh perspective, the obvious political explanation seems to us to be the better one.
Th e Burger and Rehnquist Courts
Stearns demonstrates that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts split into three camps: (1) liberal holdovers like Brennan and Marshall, later joined by Blackmun, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer; (2) conser vatives such as Burger, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas who would overrule precedent they deemed incorrect; and (3) pragmatic moder ates who were generally committed to precedent (e.g., White, Stewart, Powell, O'Connor, and Kennedy) (pp. 219-20, 234-38). The justices could not be sure that, in codifying their preferred legal outcomes in case decisions, the will of the present majority would be reflected (pp. 239-44). For instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,67 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy voted to uphold Roe v. Wa de68 on stare deci sis grounds, even though their previously expressed position was that Roe had been wrongly decided (pp. 16-23, 129-30).
According to Stearns, the justices often concluded that because they could not predict the result, it was better not to risk deciding the merits (p. 244). Furthermore, as always, the Court could use standing to foster democratic lawmaking by thwarting ideological litigants who wanted to create positive law that lacked current legislative support (pp. 239, 244).
66. The following summary draws on Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 464. 67. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Stearns's analysis ingeniously reveals why the Burger and Rehnquist Courts not only reaffirmed, but actually expanded, the standing doctrine developed by their liberal forebears.69 Unfortu nately, however, he cannot explain perhaps the most significant standing case of the past half century, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.7° There the Court struck down a provision of the Endangered Species Act authorizing "any person" to sue to enjoin federal agencies from violating that statute.71 Justice Scalia maintained that Article III banned such "generalized grievances" that the government had failed to comply with the law, and instead limited federal courts to vindicat ing the rights of individuals.72
Under Stearns's model, however, the Court should have deferred to Congress's exercise of its legislative power to affirmatively create law (to protect endangered species) and to determine who best could enforce that law (private citizens).73 For the same reason, Stearns can not justify Bennett v. Sp ear,74 which granted standing under the same Endangered Species Act "citizen suit" provision to developers who claimed economic harm when the government invoked that Act to halt their project.75 The Court thus has flouted an express statutory di rective by denying standing to those attempting to preserve endan gered species, yet welcoming entrepreneurs who want to harm such creatures.
Stearns concedes that Lujan and Bennett undercut his thesis that the Court takes an apolitical, nonideological approach to standing in order to preserve Congress's ability to make laws reflecting majoritarian preferences (pp. 271, 281-93). Despite these and a few other unruly cases, however, he contends that his social choice 69. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 467, 475-76 (describing the Burger Court's addition of two Article III requirements, causation and redressability). Social choice theory also clarifies certain seeming anomalies in the standing cases, such as the conservative Court's liberal grant of access to criminal defendants. See supra notes 57-58 and accompa nying text. Social choice analysis here is superior to an attitudinalist or political model, which would likely predict that conservative justices would restrict the standing of criminals.
Alternatively, however, this jurisprudence might reflect the conservative abhorrence to government overreaching, which has the most devastating individual consequences in the criminal area. Thus, the Court may be willing to confer standing generously for the purpose of monitoring law enforcement officials to guarantee core liberties, although it will give those officials considerable latitude. Concededly, sensitivity to criminal procedural rights has not been a hallmark of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 73. The plaintiffs in Lujan were not trying to persuade the Court to make positive law in an area where Congress had chosen not to act; rather, they were simply asking the Court to apply a law that Congress had passed. Id 
C. A Competing Model of Standing
The Court has always defended its standing decisions as dictated by the Constitution's creation of a democracy with a uniquely limited judiciary.76 This idea traces to Progressive scholars like Woodrow Wilson, who argued that the American Constitution, with its emphasis on checks and balances, inhibited the effective governance that mod ern conditions demanded.77 Instead, these intellectuals championed the English parliamentary system, which featured a unified legisla tive/executive "sovereign" (i.e., a plenary lawmaking authority) unen cumbered by judicial review of statutes. 78 Depression era politicians largely adopted this approach, as President Roosevelt and Congress worked hand-in-hand to craft the New Deal, but federal judges often invalidated this legislation.79 Felix Frankfurter solved this problem by creating -and persuading his fellow justices to adopt -a standing doctrine that incorporated the Wilsonian notion that the judiciary should avoid interfering with the sovereign political branches.80 JUstice Frankfurter did not, however, candidly acknowledge that he was responding to the practical reality of a vastly expanded federal government that might generate an un manageable volume of litigation. Rather, he insisted that his approach implemented the Constitution's text, history, precedent, and political theory. 81 Justice Frankfurter asserted that Article III reinforced basic separation-of-powers principles by restricting standing in federal court
to those who could demonstrate an "injury."82 Determining whether a plaintiff had suffered a cognizable "injury" depended upon the sub stantive law he invoked.
As to statutes, Justice Frankfurter urged judicial deference to Congress's judgment about who was "injured."83 Hence, Congress had sole power to define substantive rights (including novel ones with no common law analogue) and to decide which persons could vindicate those rights judicially -government agencies, individuals whose pri vate law rights had been directly invaded by the alleged violation of the statute, citizens acting as private attorneys general, or some com bination.84 Conversely, if Congress had not conferred standing in a particular statute, and the plaintiff instead relied upon the Administrative Procedure Act's general provision allowing suit by those "adversely affected" by an agency's action, the Court would deny standing unless the plaintiff credibly alleged a personal injury of the sort recognized by property, tort, or contract law.85
Although the foregoing approach comported with the original con stitutional design,86 Justice Frankfurter went awry when he extended his test for implied statutory standing -individualized, common law injury -to all claims arising under the Constitution.87 Such a test (and a corresponding prohibition on third party standing) might be defensi ble as applied to those constitutional clauses guaranteeing individual rights,88 but certainly not to those that either protect collective rights 86. Separation of powers demands that federal courts respect Congress's policy deter mination about how the legal rights it has created can be enforced most effectively. Thus, for example, from the beginning of the Republic, Congress has allowed standing to citizens gen erally to bring various "public actions" to ensure the government's compliance with the law. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 481-83.
87. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150-54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (contending that, in the absence of an express congressional grant of standing, the plaintiff had to show an indi vidualized inj ury to a private legal interest in order to pursue an action under a federal stat ute or the Constitution); see also Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460, 464, 468-70 (Frankfurter, J., con curring) (to similar effect).
88. Such an approach promotes liberty by allowing the person whose constitutional rights have been infringed to decide whether or not to litigate. If at least one potential plain tiff has the ability to enforce a constitutional provision protecting individual rights, that clause remains viable, and the government will be deterred from violating it. Conversely, the [Vol. 100:1265 (such as the Establishment Clause) or structure the government (e.g., most of Articles I and 11).89 To say that no one has standing to vindi cate these collective or structural provisions, unless perhaps Congress specifically lets them, turns the Constitution on its head.90
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter and his current judicial disciples have failed to grasp that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution shifted sovereignty from the government to "the People;" who ·delegate cer tain powers to their representatives in all three government depart ments.91 Thus, the federal courts' power is coextensive with -not in ferior to -that of Congress and the President.92 · . Similarly, the Constitution limits all three branches, not just the judiciary.93 More over, federal judges are not unrepresentative because they are unelected. Rather, the People removed judges from the electoral pro cess to ensure their independence in representing the People through the exercise of judicial power, especially by upholding the Constitution against transient majoritarian pressures.94 Thus, federal particularized inj ury requirement prevents meddlers from asserting the individual cons t itu tional rights of those who choose not to press them. 90. The claim that Congress alone can authorize standing to enforce the Constitution assumes that the political branches have power to preclude judicial review over their own actions that allegedly violate the Constitution. A central reason that "the People" adopted a written Constitution establishing an independent judiciary, however, was that the political branches cannot be trusted to impartially interpret restrictions on their own authority. See Pusha'w, Justiciability , supra note 59, at 485-88.
courts must "interfere" with (i.e., check) the political branches when they exceed the constitutional powers granted to them by the People. 95 In short, the Frankfurter-inspired standing doctrine frustrates separation of powers by allowing federal courts to abdicate their role of enforcing the Constitution: For present purposes, however, it does not matter whether the political theory underlying standing is right or wrong. The relevant point is that the Court has consistently implemented this theory: that judicial review is presumptively illegitimate because federal courts are peculiarly "limited" in our separation-of-powers scheme compared to the "democratic" political branches, and that this presumption can be rebutted only by a plaintiff who can demonstrate an individualized injury caused by the defen dant.
Indeed, the only. major standing case that does not fit this model is Flast v. Cohen.96 There, the Warren Court permitted taxpayers to claim that the federal government's support for religious schools vio lated the Establishment Clause, even though no individual taxpayer could show an injury distinct from that suffered by all citizens.97 Inter estingly, however, the Court did not set forth the new concept of separation of powers that apparently drove its decision: that aggres sive checking of the political branches to protect constitutional rights (broadly defined) outweighed the' efficiency interest of the political branches in acting without judicial interference.98 Rather, the Court purported to do nothing more than follow the established "limited ju diciary" rationale of standing.99
Consequently, it was easy for the Burger Court to revive the Frankfurterian notion of English constitutionalism, both in rhetoric and in reality. Indeed, every Burger Court standing decision reflects this idea, which was nicely encapsulated in Allen v. Wright: 1 00 standing "define[s] with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded," and thus re flects " 'concern about the proper -and properly limited -role of the courts in a democratic society.' "1 01
As to constitutional claims, the Burger Court emasculated Flast in the Valley Fo rge case, which denied taxpayers standing under the Establishment Clause because they had alleged a generalized griev ance that the government had violated the Constitution, not a per- [Vol. 100:1265 sonal "common law" injury resulting from such unlawful conduct. 102 Similarly, in Richardson1 0 3 and Schlesinger,1 0 4 the Court ruled that no plaintiff could demonstrate a unique harm flowing from Congress's violation of Article I's provisions requiring a public accounting of all expenditures and prohibiting Congressmen from serving at the same time in the executive branch.105 By contrast, the Court granted stand ing to criminal petitioners who alleged that unconstitutional conduct by law enforcement officials had directly injured them, but not to third parties who were unaffected by the government's actions. 106 Turning to statutory standing, the Burger Court followed Justice Frankfurter's script to the ·letter. For . example, it deferred to Congress's decision to confer broad standing to vindicate the Fair Housing Act, which created a novel "right" -a right to live in an in tegrated community -that had no common law analogue.107 Con versely, if Congress had not specifically granted such widespread standing, the justices prudentially declined to infer it. 108 The Rehnquist Court has continued the restrictive approach to standing to raise constitutional claims.109 As to statutory standing, the Court has sometimes departed from Justice Frankfurter's precise analysis, but not from his underlying constitutional theory. If, as Frankfurter asserted, the Constitution requires an individualized in jury, then Congress cannot grant broader standing, any more than it can pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. Under this reason ing, the Court in Lujan properly refused to countenance such an un constitutional statute, even though its predecessors had mistakenly done so out of misguided deference to Congress.11° Conversely, Bennett v. Sp ear111 correctly found standing because the developers alleged that they had personally suffered economic loss -the quintes sential common law injury.112
In short, the Rehnquist Court has taken Justice Frankfurter's premises to their logical extreme. The Court believes that it is faith fully adhering to the Constitution's command that the "inferior" and "limited" federal judiciary must leave the "sovereign" and "demo cratic" political branches undisturbed, even if they are violating the law, unless they happen to cause someone a traditional kind of injury. This theory undergirds nearly every modem standing decision.
III. CONCLUSION
Maxwell Stearns asks that his book be judged on two levels. First, he declares that his social choice analysis should be deemed a success if it contributes to our understanding of the Supreme Court's deci sionmaking process and its implications for the evolution of constitu tional doctrine (pp. 216-17). Second, Steams asserts that his model is better than all the others, in the sense that it explains more data, in cluding anomalies that no other theory can rationalize (pp. 217, 279-81 ).
We are not quite persuaded by this second, bolder claim. Nonetheless, Stearns has convinced us that any serious constitutional law scholar must consider his social choice theory in formulating cri tiques based on doctrine, history, politics, or any other discipline. In this respect, he has made an original, important, and enduring contri bution to the study of constitutional law.
110. If the judiciary's constitutional role is solely to vindicate individual rights, then Justice Scalia is correct that neither the Constitution nor Congress can force federal courts to hear general claims that the government has not followed the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-78 (1992) . Again, we are arguing here that the Court has logically applied a single political theory in its standing cases, not that we agree with this theory. In deed, the Lujan Court ignored two centuries of American history authorizing public law ac tions to ensure the government's compliance with the law, which in turn incorporated an cient English practices. See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 59, at 483-85.
111. 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
112. Id. at 167-68, 176-77.
